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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
VICTOR L. PETERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
WILLIAM D. CALLISTER,
et al.,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 8584

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant has given an accurate statement of
the facts in his brief excepting statements made in
Paragraph 2 on Page 4. The appellant's statement,
however, emphasizes claimed irregularities supporting plaintiff's title.
The record discloses that the land in question
was patented to Freeland Bales on November 8, 1926,
but that he did not record this patent until August 5,
1930 (Page 1, abstract of title, plaintiff's Exhibit A).
One vear after he received this patent he allowed the
taxes to go delinquent and never did pay the taxes for
1927 nor any other subsequent years. This property
went to tax sale to San Juan County in 1927. The tax
sale was not redeemed. Taxes for the subsequent
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years, 1928, 1929 and 1930, were not paid and on
March 12, 1932, an Auditor's Tax Deed was issued
conveying the property to San Juan County because
of the nonpayment of taxes by the original owner.
The original owner did nothing about paying
these delinquent taxes or purchasing the property
from the County. Title to the property remained in
San Juan County for a period of 8 years from 1932 to
1940, at which time the plaintiff contracted the San
Juan County Commissioners and arranged to purchase the property under a contract of sale. Plaintiff
paid the agreed consideration to the County, and a
Tax Deed was issued to him on February 9, 1944
(Page 3, abstract of title, plaintiff's Exhibit A). The
plaintiff has each year since 1944 paid the taxes in
full either by payment before they were delinquent
or by redeeming them during their redemption period.
The original owner, Freeland Bales, did nothing
with the land and apparently n1ade no claim to it,
and on September 1, 1948, he executed a Quitclaim
Deed to William D. Callister, defendant and appellant herein, for the sum of $10.00 and other consideration (Page 4, abstract of title, plaintiff's Exhibit
A). Mr. Callister did nothing with the land, paid no
taxes, but after land values had risen in San Juan
County and after the plaintiff had cultivated and improved the property and made it an operating farm,
and after plaintiff filed his suit to quiet titlf'. defendant, after a lapse of time of approximate!:~ 29 :Tears
fron1 the thn(\ of the first delinquent tax sale in 1927,

4
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comes into Court and defends the action and claims
that he is the owner.
.At page 4, paragraph 2, of appellant's brief, appellant states that in the .Auditor's Tax Deed there is
no reference to the year for which the property was
assessed and later on in his brief claims that this is
fatally defective. The .Auditor's Tax Deed which appears at page 2 of the abstract of title, plaintiff's
Exhibit A, does state the year for which the taxes
were assessed and not paid. The following language
appears on page 2 of the abstract.
"Deed issued pursuant to Certificate of
Sale by E. L. Jones, as County Treasurer of
San Juan County, dated December 21, 1927, for
delinquent taxes in the amount of $32.74."
The appellant's statement of fact mentions that
Exhibit B shows the payment of taxes. The taxes
were paid before they were delinquent by Victor L.
Peterson for 4 consecutive years befo~e the law suit
was filed, 1951 to 1954 inclusive. This same Exhibit
also shows that he paid the taxes before they were
delinguent for 1955, but this payment was made after
the suit was commenced.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
In connection with this appeal the appellant has
argued his case under 4 separate headings. For the
purpose of replying to the argument of appellant,
respondent will answer each of appellant's points,
and then submit argument supporting respondant's
points which are as follows:
5
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1. Defendant is barred from asserting any right,
title or interest to the land or from setting up any defense to plaintiff's complaint by the 4 year statute
of limitations where the property is acquired under
tax title.
2. Defendant is barred from asserting any right,
title or interest to the land or from setting up any defense to plaintiff's complaint by the general 7 year
statute of limitations.
3. Plaintiff has a valid title to the property under the 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles plus
exclusive possession during this period and the payment of taxes during the 4 year period.
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S ARGU:JIEXT
Defendant's point No. 1 is that '"Plaintiff has
not established a valid tax title.'' In answer to this
point plaintiff admits that it has not established a
valid title through the tax proceedings alone, because
as stipulated at the trial, the Auditor's Affidavit was
not attached to the 1927 tax sale record. \Y e admit
this but assert that we do not admit all of the proceedings in the tax sale being invalid. \Ye do rely on the
issuance of an Auditor's Tax Deed in1932 conveying
this property to San Juan County for nonpayment of
taxes and the subsequent purchase of this tax title by
the plaintiff from San Juan County in l~l±-!. At the
time of the purchase of this land fro1n San Juan
County on February 6, 1940 (Page :3. plaintiff's Exhibit A) plaintiff went illto possession of the property in 1943 and has farn1ed the land, grazed it.
6
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fenced it, cut wood and posts from it, and held it
openly, continuously and adverse to the defendant
and to the exclusion of the defendant. He has also
paid the taxes and has established a title by adverse
possession under the 4 year statute for tax titles
which will be discussed later on as plaintiff's point
No.3.
As point No. 2 defendant states ''Plaintiff has
failed to establish any title whatsoever." In answer
to this claim plaintiff relies on the Auditor's Tax
Deed at page 2 of the abstract, plaintiff's Exhibit A,
and the Tax Deed from San Juan County to plaintiff
at page 3 of the same abstract and exhibit. Defendant
claims that these instruments are defective in that
they do not show they are witnessed and do not
show an acknowledgment. These instruments were
not set forth in full in the abstract and were not
intended as full instruments. They are both briefed
down as abstract entries and under Section 1-1-15,
UOA, 1953, are prima facie evidence of their contents. If defendant claims that the Auditor's Tax
Deed and the Tax Deed from the County to the
Plaintiff were defective in the abstract and the
abstract did not correctly show the instruments or
their contents briefed down, defendant should have
then gone forward and introduced the entire instruments in evidence. They were both recorded
and available for the defendant to introduce as evidence at the trial if he claimed that they were defective in any way.
The abstract of title showing the conveyances
against a particular tract of land is hy natnr<' briefed
7
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down and it does not purport to show the instruments
in full nor all of the recitations in the instruments.
An abstract of title is defined as follows:
"An abstract of title is a compilation in
orderly arrangement and abridged form of the
materials and facts of record affecting title to
a specific piece of land . . . a short methodical
summary of the documents and instruments of
record, ... a short account of the state of the
title, or a synopsis of the instruments which
show title, ... It is not the complete evidence
of the title, but a synopsis of the data as to the
ti tie.'' 1 Am. J ur. page 155, Section 1.
There is no requirement in the laws that the signature to a Deed must be witnessed. As a rna tter of
practice many deeds do show the name of the individual who witnessed the Grantor sign, but it is not essential for the validity of the deed.
Defendant claims that the instruments are also
defective because there is no acknowledgement shown
on these two abstract entries. The fact that the abstracter did not show an acknowledgement on these
two entries is not conclusive that there were no ncknowledgements on the original instruments. As
stated above, if defendant claims the lack of an acknowledgement as a rlefeet in the instrmnent he
should have introduced the full instrun1ent in evidence to negative the prima facie showing of these
two Deeds by the abstract (•ntri(•s.
Section 80-10-68, UCA. 194~1, sets forth the forn1
for a Tax Deed and reeites that this Deed "'shall be

8
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prima facie evidence of all proceedings subsequent
to the preliminary sale and of the conveyance of the
property to the Grantee in fee simple.'' The Tax
Deed at page 3 of the abstract, plaintiff's Exhibit A,
conforms exactly to the form set forth in this Section.
This form does not prescribe any acknowledgement
and does not show any requirement for the signature
of the Auditor to be witnessed. This instrument is,
therefore, prima facie evidence of the regularity of
all the pocedings and of the conveyance to San Juan
County by Auditor's Tax Deed and the subsequent
conveyance by the County of the property to Victor
L. Peterson in fee simple, excepting only the admission at the trial that the Auditor's Affidavit was not
attached to the 1927 tax sale. All the other proceedings to and including the issuance of the deed to
plaintiff are presumed to be regular. Under this
statute theAuditor 's Tax Deed would, therefore, be
presumed to be regular in all respects and to convey
a fee simple title as far as the form and contents of
the Auditor's Tax Deed is concerned, and if defendant claimed to the contrary he would have the burden
of coming forward with proof to show that the Auditor's Tax Deed was defective in so1ne respect.
Section 57-4-4, UCA, 1953, validates all instruments recorded prior to January 1, 1943, notwithstanding any defect, omission or informality in the
acknowledgement of the instrument. The Auditor's /
Tax Deed issued March 12, 1932, would, therefore,
be validated under this section even if there were a
defect or omission in the acknowledgement of this instrument.
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There is also a presumption that public officers
have complied with the law in the execution, delivery
and recording of the Auditor's Tax Deed and the Tax
Deed from San Juan County. 20 Am. Jur. beginning
at page 174 provides:
Section 170. ''In the absence of any proof
to the contrary there is a very strong presumption ... that public officers have properly discharged the duties of their office and performed
faithfully those matters with which they are
charged.''
Section 171. ''The presumptions that public officers discharge the duties of the office
and that in the discharge of such duties observe
all the necessary and proper formalities imposed by la-w are applicable to all Federal, State,
County and J\funicipal officers of high or low
rank and to the official duties and acts of Public
Boards and Commissions ... It is the settled and
well entrenched policy of the law to indulge in
every reasonable presumption in favor of sustaining the ministerial acts of officers.''
There would, therefore, be a presumption that these
acknowledgements, if they \-vere required. were in
proper form and signed and the burden would again
be upon the defendant to come forward with proof to
show the contrar~r. Farrer y· s. Johnson, 271 P 2d
462, 2 Utah 2d 189 (1954).
The only purpose for an acknowledge1nent is to
add formalit~r to the execution of an instrun1ent so
that it can be recorded. Failure to aekno\Yledge a
10
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deed of conveyance does not render the instrument
void or invalid as between the parties. See 57-1-6,
U CA, 1953, states that a deed
'' ... shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledgement, certification or record and as to all other
persons who have had actual notice."
Plaintiff was in actual possession of the land in 1948
when defendant received his deed and defendant
would, therefore, be charged with notice of plaintiff's ownership and claim to the land. See Toland
Vs. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190, affirmed 154 U.S.
499; Neponset Land and Livestock Co. V s. Dixon, 10
Utah 334,37 P. 573. The Auditor's Tax Deed and the
Tax Deed from San Juan County would, therefore,
be valid as between the defendant and San Juan
County and the Plaintiff.
Defendant's argument and the citations as to the
manner of acknowledging and proving conveyances
has no application here because they apply only as to
whether the instruments are admissable in evidence.
Both instruments were admitted in evidence in plaintiff's Exhibit A under the signature and seal of the
Abstract Company.
As defendant's point 3 he asserts ''The legal
title holder is not barred by the 4 year adverse possession or limitations statutes on tax titles." In support of this claim defendant states that plaintiff has
failed to show that the title was acquired by plaintiff
in the course of a statuatory proceeding for the liq11
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uida tion of a tax levied against the property and to
show that the propert is relieved from a tax lien.
Plaintiff overlooks the recitations in the last paragraphs of the two Deeds at page 2 and 3 of the abstract, plaintiff's Exhibit A. Both recite that the
taxes on the land were delinquent and that there was
a preliminary sale in 1927. This claim is an afterthought by the defendant because his counsel at page
15, lines 20 to 25 of the transcript admits that the
property was sold for non-payment of taxes in 1927.
Plaintiff was not required to introduce in evidence the Certificate of Sale as claimed by the defendant. The Auditor's Tax Deed and the Tax Deed
from San Juan County were both prima facie evidence of the regularity of the proceedings prior to
their issuance.
That defendant is barred by the 4 year statute of
limitations on tax titles will be discussed hereafter in
plaintiff's points Nos. 1 and 3.
.As point No. 4 defendant asserts '• Legal title
holder is not barred by the 7 year adverse possession
or limitation statutes." In answer to this claim plaintiff admits that the evidence does not show payn1ent
of taxes before they were delinquent for a period of
7 consecutive years, but plaintiff was in actual possession of this property since 1943, which is a period
in excess of 7 years. This possession was open, notorious, exclusive and adverse to the defendant, as
stated above, and was to the exclusion of the defendant. There is no evidence that defendant 'yas in possession of the land at an~· tin1e after 1932 when the
.Auditor's Tax Deed was issnrrl. and defendant n1akes
1~
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no claim that he was in actual possession of the land
after that date. Under the provisions of 104-2-5 and
104-2-5.10 of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951, which
are now Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5, 2, U CA, 1953,
defendant is barred from asserting any claim or title
or setting up any defense to plaintiff's complaint.
'This problem will be further discussed under
plaintiff's point No. 2.
As conclusions defendant asks that the lower
Court be reversed and that a Decree be entered
against the plaintiff in favor of the defendant and
appellant herein adjudging and decreeing that defendant is the owner in fee simple of the land involved in the suit. In this demand defendant exceeds
the prayer of his complaint. In the prayer of his coinplaint defendant does not ask for any affirmative
relief but only asks that the plaintiff take nothing
by his Complaint. Defendant only filed an Ansvvrer,
and there is no Counter Claim or Cross Complaint.
Defendant is, therefore, not entitled to any affirmative relief, and there should be no Decree quieting
title in the defendant, even if the court found that
plaintiff was not entitled to have title quieted in him.
The most that could be done would be to send the
case back for new trial or to set aside the Findings
and Decree Quieting Title in the Plaintiff.
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S POINTS
POINT 1
DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM ASSERTING ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST
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TO THE LAND OR FROM SETTING UP ANY
DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BY
THE 4 YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
WHERE THE PROPERTY IS ACQUIRED UNDER TAX TITLE.
Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, U CA, 1953, set
up the 4 year statute of limitations against the orginal
owner where property has been acquired under tax
title and is held and possessed by the new tax title
purchaser. These two sections were formerly Sections 104-2-5 and 104-2-5.10 of the 1943 code as
amended and enacted by Chapter 19 of the 1951 session laws. Seetion 78-12-5.3, UC.A., 1953, which was
formerly Section 104-2-5.11 of the 1943 code enacted
by Chapter 19 of the 1951 session laws defines what
is a tax title. In order to come within this definition
the tax title does not have to be valid. In the words
of this section it states ''Whether valid or not.'' The
tax title under these 3 Sections quoted in this paragraph originated by the Auditor's Tax Deed issued
to San Juan County in 1932, which appears at page
2 of the abstrart of title, plaintiff's Exhibit .L~· This
Auditor's Tax Deed by its very terms is one of the
instrun1ents issued 'vhere the original owner has
failed to pay the taxes and they have gone delinquent
for a period of 4 years, after 'Yhich tin1e the County
was authorized to issue an Auditor's Tax Deed conveying the property to San Juan County. The term
''Auditor's Tax Deed'' brings it within the provisions
of Section 78-12-5.3 and shows that it was issued to
relieve property for the non-payment of taxes by the
original owner. In addition to this the deed itself re- _
<·.ites that th<\ 1927 tnx<•s were delinquent, not paid,
J -l
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and there was a tax sale on December 21, 1927, for
these delinquent taxes. A period of 24 years has
elapsed since this Deed was issued, and the original
owner is now barred from attempting to assert his
title.
Argument is made by the defendant that the
Auditor's Tax Deed as it appears in the abstract
entry is fatally defective. This question has already
been answered heretofore in this brief. As heretofore stated Section 80-10-68, UCA, 1943, provides
that the tax deed issued by San Juan County to the
plaintiff herein which appears at page 3 of the abstract, plaintiff's Exhibit A, makes all of the tax
proceedings including the Auditor's Tax Deed and
Tax Deed from San Juan County prima facie, regular and valid. This same Tax Deed from San Juan
County also recites that the taxes for 1927, 1928 and
1929 and 1930 were not paid by the original owner
and that this tax title deed was issued by reason
thereof.
Plaintiff's title is based on a tax title and section 104-2-7, UCA, 1943, as amended by Chapter 19,
1951 Session Laws, which is now Section 78-12-7.1,
UCA, 1953, states that "He (the plaintiff herein)
shall be presumed to be the owner of such property
by adverse possession . . . " because defendant has
not been in possession and plaintiff has paid the
taxes for more than 4 years.
Plaintiff has been in actual possession of the
land since 1943 and has occuppied, farmed and
grazed the area continuously since then. Defendant
15
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has not been in possession of the land since prior to
1932 and makes no claim that he was.
The lower Court found that plaintiff's title was
derived from a tax title more than 4 years prior to
bringing this action and that plaintiff had been in
possession to the exclusion of defendant since 1943.
There is an abundance of evidence to support these
findings by the trial court to bring the case under
these 2 statutes and the trial court should be sustained therein.
POINT 2
DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM ASSERTING ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST
TO THE LAND OR FROl\1 SETTING UP ANY
DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S CO:JIPLAIXT BY
THE GENERAL 7 YEAR STATUTE OF LI:JIITATIONS.
These same sections mentioned above, 78-12-5.1
and 78-12-5.2, UCA, 1953, give a general statute of
limitations for a 7 year period and the 7 year feature of the same statutes also bar the defendant
from asserting his claim in this action. Plaintiff
has been in possession and more than 7 ~·ears has
expired since the Tax Deed ·was issued to the plaintiff in 1944. The argument supporting Plaintiff's
point No. 1 is also applicable to this 7 ~·e~n· statute
of limitations. The only difference between the 2
provisions of the same statutes is the period of tin1e.
Any presun1ption that defendant Inay claim by
of the patent issued to the patentee and de-

r<'af-1011
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fendant's Quitclaim Deed from the patentee of the
effect that the owner under a Deed is presumed to
be in possession is overcome by the facts and evidence in this case showing that plaintiff has actually been in open, notorious, exclusive and adverse
possession of this property since and including 1943.
The facts in this case come within the provisions
of the Utah case Farrer vs. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189,
271 P. 2d 462, which by part of the decision held
that the plaintiff in that case were barred from asserting their title under the 7 year statute of limitations, 78-12-5 and 78-12-6, UCA, 1953, and held
that the parties holding this property under adverse
possession were entitled to have title quieted in them.
POINT 3.
PLAINTIFF HAS A VALID TITLE TO
THE PROPERTY UNDER THE 4 YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON TAX TITLES
PLUS EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION DURING
THIS PERIOD AND THE PAYMENT OF
TAXES DURING THE 4 YEAR PERIOD.
In addition to the defendant being barred by
the 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles and
the general 7 year statute of limitations, both discussed above, in plaintiff's points Nos. 1 and 2, plaintiff has initiated a new and valid title by being
fendant has initiated a new and valid title by being
in open, notorious and adverse possession of property since 1943 (See page 12 of defendant's brief
for supporting statement of facts.) and paying the
taxes for more than 4 years. Plaintiff has paid the
taxes before they became delinquent on said prop17
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erty for the years 1951 to 1955 inclusive, in
of 4 years. (Plaintiff's Exhibit B)

e~cess

Plaintiff could establish a new and valid title
by adverse possession under the general 7 year statute except for the fact that the taxes were not paid
before they became delinquent for a period of 7
consecutive years and under the court's ruling in
Bowen vs. Olsen 2 Utah 2nd 12, 268P. 2d 983, that
redeeming the delinquent taxes for some of these
years is not the same as payment. Except for these
taxes being redeemed rather than paid before delinquent for the years 1943 to 1949 inclusive plaintiff would come under the provisions of this general
7 year statute. This section was amended in 1951
for the specific purpose of helping to validate these
tax titles under which the plaintiff holds and plaintiff has established title under this 4 year statute
of limitations.
The fact situation in this case is identical with
the fact situation set forth in the case of Hansen vs.
Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884, wherein this
Court upheld the validity of this 4 year statute of
limitations on tax titles and quieted the title of the
tax sale purchaser after he had held the property
for a period in excess of 4 years after receiving a
tax deed from the County, and the original owner
had not been in possession during this 4 ~~ear period.
The trial court, therefore, properly found that
plaintiff's title had been purchased from San Juan
County by a tax deed, that his title '-rns a tax title,
that he had been in open, notorious and adverse
possession of the property continuously sinee 1943
18
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and had paid the taxes on said property for a period
of 5 consecutive years. Pursuant to the findings
the court properly decreed that plaintiff was the
owner of this property. There is ample evidence to
support the court's findings as detailed above.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Defendant is barred from asserting any defense to plaintiff's complaint or from asserting any
right, title or interest in said property by reason of
the 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles and
also by reason of the general 7 year statute of limitations.
2. Plaintiff has established a good and valid

title by adverse possession and payment of taxes
under the 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles.
3. There was ample evidence to support plaintiff's findings and the trial court's findings and
decree should be sustained.
4. Even if the lower court is not sustained,

the case should be remanded back for further proceedings for a new trial and for proceedings in aceorc1_aneP with Section 59-10-65, UCA, 1953.
Respectfully submitted,

FRANDSEN AND KELLEH.
By Dnane A. Frandsen
Price, Utah
F. BENNION REDD
lvionticello, Utah
Attorneys for J>zm:nt 1ff a·nrl
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